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ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, most aircraft components are designed according to two different philosophies: the 
Safe-Life or Damage Tolerance approach. Both concepts cover a different part of the lifetime and 
are based on so-called deterministic models, in which the model parameters are constants (single-
valued). In order to compensate for neglecting the natural variability of the model parameters 
(e.g. scatter in material parameters) and other uncertainties, scatter and safety factors are applied 
explicitly and implicitly (e.g. by means of an assumed initial crack length). The results obtained 
with both approaches can be very conservative, although the safety level (reliability) of the 
design remains unknown. 
 
Another better way of dealing with this variability of the model parameters is by means of a 
stochastic analysis, adding an extra dimension to the deterministic analysis, by introducing a 
range of values that can occur with their chance on occurrence. However, performing a stochastic 
Damage Tolerance or Durability analysis does not make much sense, since the most important 
stochastic parameter, initial crack length distribution, is unknown. 
 
In this paper, an alternative life philosophy named SLAP (Stochastic Life APproach) will be 
presented by which the lifetime and inspection scheme of a component can be determined in a 
fully stochastic manner, covering the crack initiation period as well as the crack growth period in 
a realistic way. The approach can serve as an alternative for the current approaches, especially 
the Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance approaches, resulting in more realistic predictions of the 
lifetime and inspection scheme. 
 
The method is demonstrated by a realistic example based on in-service inspection data gathered 
for  the Upper Longeron of the F-16. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Before introducing the SLAP philosophy in the next chapter, first some background information 
is provided describing the current two lifing philosophies as applied for military aircraft and 
subsequently some issues related to deterministic and stochastic analysis in general. 
 
Airworthiness regulations require proof that aircraft can be operated safely. This implies that 
critical components must be replaced or repaired before safe operation can no longer be 
guaranteed. Different approaches can be followed to prove that a component is safe. For military 
aircraft the approach followed depends on the customer requirements, the type of component and 
the possibilities for inspection during service. The fatigue philosophies underlying the 
approaches for guaranteeing safety are called Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance. 
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The Safe-Life philosophy is based on the concept that significant damage, i.e. fatigue cracking, 
will not develop during the service life of a component. The actual life for which this is "true" is 
calculated and then checked by a suitable test programme. Then the design safe-life is obtained 
by factoring the determined life by an appropriate safety factor. When the service life equals the 
design safe-life the component has to be replaced. The US Navy and US Army, for example, 
apply this philosophy. However, there is a major drawback, since components are taken out of 
service when they may still have substantial remaining lives. Also, despite all precautions, it is 
still possible for cracks to occur prematurely, and this fact has led the US Air Force to introduce 
the Damage Tolerance philosophy. 
 
The Damage Tolerance philosophy not only recognises that damage can occur and develop 
during the service life of a component, but it also stipulates that the possibility of cracks or flaws 
in a new structure should be accounted for. Safety is incorporated into this approach by the 
requirements either that (1) any damage be detected by routine inspection before it results in a 
dangerous reduction of the static strength (inspectable components), or (2) the damage shall not 
grow to a dangerous size during the service life (non-inspectable components). 
 
Two requirements are necessary for this approach to be successful. First, it must be possible to 
define either a minimum crack length ad that will not go undetected during routine inspections, or 
else an initial crack length ai based on pre-service inspection. Second, one should be able to 
predict the growth of such cracks during the time until the next inspection or until the design 
service life is reached. The result of a Damage Tolerance analysis is a curve presenting the crack 
length as function of the number of cycles, starting from the initial crack length ai up to the 
critical crack length acr. (When a component is not safety-critical a similar analysis can be done 
with a significantly smaller initial crack length. This is called a Durability analysis, which is 
directed to assessing the economic life of a component. The US Air Force makes use of both 
Damage Tolerance and Durability analyses.) 
 
From fracture surface investigations it is known that for virgin undamaged materials a 
considerable time is spend to initiate a crack. After initiation the crack will grow till failure. The 
ratio between crack initiation life and crack growth life depends on the geometry and loading. 
Material property data used in a Safe-Life analysis is often obtained from tests on narrow 
specimen. Such specimens fail shortly after a crack initiates. This implies that for a Safe-Life 
analysis the crack growth part of the life is ignored. The Damage Tolerance philosophy on the 
other hand starts with a crack of minimal detectable size therefore ignoring the crack initiation 
life. This notion encouraged civil aircraft manufactures to combine both approaches. They often 
use the Safe-Life approach (with the proper material property data) to determine the crack 
initiation life and from that the initial inspection. The Damage Tolerance approach is used to 
determine the repeat inspection intervals. 
 
In chapter 2 an alternative approach will be presented. This approach includes both the initiation 
and crack growth life simultaneously and in a stochastic way. A first example in which this 
approach is applied to a structural component of the F-16 will be presented in chapter 3. 
What follows first are some general remarks and considerations related to deterministic and 
stochastic analysis in general. 
 
1.1 Deterministic Analysis 
The above analyses are based on a so-called deterministic analysis. This means that the 
variability of the parameters used in the model, introducing variability in the results of the model, 
is not taken into account. In order to account for the variability in material properties, 
manufacturing quality, et cetera: scatter and safety factors are introduced (e.g. Ref. 1). For 
material parameters often conservative lower bound values are used, such as the A- and B-value, 
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which represent the 95 % confidence lower limit on the first, respectively, tenth percentile of 
their distribution (Ref. 2). Furthermore, often a scatter factor of 1.5 is put on the limit load. 
Finally, often a safety factor of two to four is set on the obtained lifetime. 
In general the result will be a very conservative life estimate and inspection scheme. The 
reliability of the structural design, i.e. one minus the probability that the structure will fail, is 
unknown. Moreover, the safety factors applied (e.g. 1.5) are quite arbitrary (Ref. 3), although 
historically successful, probably caused by the high degree of conservatism. 
 
Elements of uncertainty are inherent in almost any engineering system. Therefore, these systems 
will always behave to a certain extent in an unpredictable way, no matter how much is known 
about the systems behaviour. It is known in general that absolute safe systems do not exist, since 
even the safest systems sometimes fail unexpectedly. Moreover, the demand for lighter more 
economical structures forces an ongoing optimisation of engineering structures. Also the 
introduction of new materials (e.g. composites, fibre metal laminates) and design methodologies 
might require other safety factors than the historically applied ones. Applying the same safety 
factors as before will therefore in general not result in a similar safety level and could lead to 
unsafe designs. 
 
Another related issue is the ongoing increase in computer power, which allows engineers to 
further expand their computational models by introducing more and more structural details, 
believing that this will improve the accuracy and reliability of the design. However, this will only 
be the case to a certain extent. Errors (e.g. modelling errors) remain or are even introduced (the 
chance on input errors increases with complexity of the numerical model). Besides this, often 
only a small part of the generated data is used, debating the usefulness of this approach. More 
useful would be to use a less detailed, but correct, model and use the computing power for a 
stochastic (reliability) analysis on top of this model. This is further discussed in the next section. 
For this purpose powerful stochastic methods have been developed (e.g. Ref. 4) in the last 
decades. 
 
A more worrying fact is that application of safety factors afterwards might even lead to 
unconservative results. For example taking into account scatter in non-linear systems during the 
analysis stage can have a considerable effect on the outcome of the model. The sensitivity of 
such systems for even slight changes in the input parameters is a well-known phenomenon. A 
correction afterwards on a deterministically obtained result might therefore result in an unsafe 
design. Non-linear models are more and more applied in the design stage of structures, due to 
increased computational power and availability of these numerical tools. 
 
Once a certain deterministic analysis has been performed the results often are compared with 
experimental data. However, the outcome is questionable, certainly in cases with substantial 
scatter and limited experimental results. In these cases correlation between the numerical and 
experimental results can be pure coincidence. The only correct approach is to take into account 
the scatter in the analysis by performing a stochastic analysis and compare the results with 
experimentally obtained ones, schematised in figure 1.1. The conclusion that the numerical result 
(denoted by a 90 % scatter band) correlate with the experimental ones (denoted by circles) is 
valid and gives real confidence in the numerical analysis. Moreover, extra information can be 
obtained, such as: the safety level of the design (reliability) and the directions to most efficiently 
modify the design in order to increase reliability. 
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Figure 1.1  Schematised ideal relation between the scatter found in measurements and analysis 
 
Another important point to mention is that stochastic methods can not be used to improve the 
deterministic model. If the outcome of the deterministic model for all mean parameter values 
(denoted by a star) is not close enough to the mean of the experimental results, the conclusion 
can be drawn that the deterministic model is lacking some physical phenomenon and therefore is 
not reliable in predicting reality. 
 
1.2 Stochastic Analysis 
Bearing in mind the reasons mentioned in the previous section, it becomes increasingly important 
to replace the deterministic by a stochastic approach, including the variability of the model 
parameters in a ‘natural way’.  
Good stochastic tools are available nowadays. What basically is lacking is the proper knowledge, 
familiarity with the subject, having enough confidence in the approach to apply them, and to a 
certain extent the will to change the current deterministic design philosophy (why change 
something what has proven itself to work).  Adopting a new design philosophy requires an open 
mind to begin with. 
If the above conditions are fulfilled application of a stochastic design philosophy can become 
common practice. Computing power is often no longer an issue and good stochastic tools are 
available. The stochastic tool functions as a shell on top of any existing deterministic tool or can 
be integrated with it. The latter, for example stochastic FEM, is not attractive here since it 
requires a rewrite of the deterministic code. 
 
Another argument not to use stochastic tools is the lack of sufficient data to generate proper 
distribution functions. This can certainly be a problem, however, with available data and some 
engineering judgement, in many of these cases a useful stochastic analysis can be made 
providing all the advantages discussed above. For example, the distribution type can often be 
allocated based on physics, together with a mean value and an upper bound of the coefficient of 
variation. In this way a lower bound of the distribution can be fully characterised. Nevertheless, 
experimental programs should be set-up to collect sufficient statistical data, which is not 
common practice at the moment. 
 
In the field of fatigue analysis a vast amount of tests have been performed and are still 
performed, generating huge amounts of data. In this field stochastic methods already have been 
applied for a while. Due to, amongst others, the large amount of scatter seen in fatigue 
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experiments. Mostly the Monte-Carlo method is applied due to its simplicity and versatility, but 
much more efficient and accurate methods exist, e.g. Ref. 4. 
 
The following steps can be distinguished in a stochastic analysis: 
• Choice of random variables and their distribution functions 
• Choice of failure function 
• Solution of  the stochastic problem, requiring a stochastic method 
• Interpretation of the results 
 
These steps will not be detailed here, see for example reference 1, but roughly outlined.  
 
Based on available data, goodness-of-fit tests and engineering judgement, distribution functions 
can be assigned to every model parameter (excluding non-physical parameters, such as tuning 
parameters necessary for the correct operation of numerical algorithms). By means of a 
sensitivity analysis it can be determined whether a model parameter or combination of 
parameters should be treated as stochastic (random) variable(s). That is: is the scatter in these 
parameters causing any significant scatter in the results of interest? If not so, these variables can 
be treated deterministically. 
 
The choice of failure function(s) is in most cases straightforward, although a more or less 
continuous behaviour of this function in the stochastic domain is preferred. 
 
There exist numerous numerical techniques to solve the stochastic problem (e.g. Ref. 4). The 
most simple and well-known method is the Monte Carlo method, but is not very efficient 
especially when dealing with smaller probabilities of failure (< 10-3), which is the case for 
engineering structures. More efficient methods, such as FORM, SORM and Importance 
Sampling methods, have been developed in the past decades. There exist commercial tools (FPI, 
ST-ORM) or in-house developed tools having implemented several of these methods. At NLR a 
stochastic tool has been implemented over the past six years called RAP (Reliability Analysis 
Program, Ref. 5) including methods as, FORM, SORM and several Importance Sampling 
methods: radial based Monte-Carlo, Latin-Hypercube, Directional sampling, Adaptive 
Directional Importance Sampling (ADIS). These stochastic tools operate on top of any 
deterministic tool and need no modifications to the deterministic tool what-so-ever to operate. An 
interface between the stochastic and deterministic tool is provided by the stochastic tool. The 
extra input compared to the deterministic analysis, consists of specification of the random 
variables and their distribution functions, specification of the failure function(s) and selection of 
the stochastic method to be applied.  
 
An important issue in interpretation of the results obtained is determining the allowed probability 
of failure. Table 1.1 (Ref. 6) depicts some target probability values for lifetimes, based on the 
relative costs of safety measures against the consequences of failure. In general, the target 
lifetime probability of failure will be in the order of 10-3 for engineering problems. 
 
Table 1.1  Lifetime probability of failure targets according to ISO 2394, Ref. 6 
 
Consequences of failure Relative costs 
of safety 
measures Small Some Moderate Great 
High 0 10-1 10-2 10-3 
Moderate 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 
Low 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 
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According to reference 3 this probability of failure should be of the order 10-7 per flight hour for 
aircraft structures, i.e. approximately 10-3 for the lifetime (assuming 104 flight hours during a 
lifetime). 
 
As mentioned before it is a prerequisite that the underlying deterministic model is a good 
representation of reality, not lacking important phenomena. 
 
 
2 ALTERNATIVE STOCHASTIC LIFE APPROACH (SLAP) 
The Damage Tolerance approach has an inherent strange assumption in it that leads to very 
conservative results. The initial damage size is based on the Probability Of Detection (POD) of 
the inspection method. In other words the inspection method determines the initial crack length 
and not the damage that actually may be present in the structural component. This observation 
has lead to the concept of Equivalent Initial Flaw Size (EIFS). The critical crack length and life 
of the component are used to determine the crack length at time zero (start of functional life) by 
means of a backward crack growth calculation. This approach leads to an equivalent initial flaw 
size, which is not the true flaw size as the name already indicates, due to the fact that the crack 
growth model used is not valid anymore before the long crack length region. Performing this 
backward crack growth calculation for many crack length/life combinations found in similar 
components results in an EIFS distribution. The only way the EIFS concept can be used is by 
assuming that the EIFS distribution obtained is representative for the structural detail under 
design, which often is more complex. 
 
The idea of a backward crack growth analysis can be used in another way. In the figures 2.1 to 
2.5 an alternative fully stochastic approach called SLAP (Stochastic Life APproach) is presented 
by which the lifetime and inspection scheme of a structural component can be determined, 
covering the crack initiation as well as the crack growth period in a much more realistic way. The 
approach consists of the following three steps: 
 
1.  Construct the failure distribution 
2.  Backward crack growth analyses 
3.  Forward crack growth analyses including inspections 
 
The basic principle related to these steps will be discussed underneath. In chapter 3 more details 
will be presented, discussing the approach for a realistic application. 
 
Step 1: Construct the failure distribution 
First, the failure distribution has to be obtained, e.g. by means of a Weibull analysis. This failure 
distribution should be a conservative estimate (lower bound) based on a limited set of 
experiments and will be updated during the lifetime of the component with in-service data 
(failure and non-failure data) that become available, to enhance safety. This will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 3 and appendix A. 
 
An important notion is that all the scatter introduced by material properties, load spectrum, et 
cetera is included in this one failure distribution and therefore need not to be characterised 
separately. Moreover, the scatter present in the component can be updated easily afterwards in 
this way. This is a very important advantage over using the scatter in all the model parameters 
(material properties, loads, etc.), since these data values are often hard to acquire and can often 
not be acquired afterwards. Furthermore, a limited number of random variables is a very 
attractive concept especially for use in industry. 
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Figure 2.1  Step 1 of the SLAP philosophy 
 
Step 2: Backward crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and 
corresponding crack length distribution 
a) Secondly, a backward calculation is performed starting from the failure distribution of the 
component. However, this backward calculation is not proceeded until the time zero as in the 
EIFS approach, but until a detectable crack length (adet in figure 2.2) has been reached, 
determined by the inspection method used (comparable with the Damage Tolerance 
philosophy). The resulting distribution (PDF-adet in figure 2.2) corresponds to an estimate of 
the distribution describing the time it takes before a crack of length adet is present in a certain 
percentage of the components. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Step 2a of the SLAP philosophy 
 
b) When a certain threshold percentage (pth, e.g. 1 %, Fig. 2.3) of these detectable cracks are 
present, the initial (threshold) inspection becomes opportune. An earlier inspection does not 
make much sense, since cracks that exist are hard to find anyway with a reasonable chance 
on detection. In this way the time for the initial inspection tinitial can be obtained in a realistic 
conservative way, covering the crack initiation, micro and short crack period, without the 
need to explicitly model these phenomena. Thus, not requiring micro-crack and initiation 
models, for which good models are “currently” lacking. Even short crack models are not 
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required, since the detectable crack length will be a long crack (> 1 mm) in general for the 
inspection techniques in use today. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Step 2b of the SLAP philosophy 
 
c) Next, the crack length distribution function (PDF-tinitial in figure 2.4) at tinitial can be obtained 
simultaneously by extending the back crack growth analysis a bit further. Also now there is 
no need for initiation, micro and short crack models.  In some cases this latter might not be 
completely true for the lower tail of this distribution, however, this part of the PDF will not 
contribute to the probability of failure (discussed in the next step) and is therefore irrelevant 
here. The above will be demonstrated and more detailed in the example given in chapter 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4  Step 2c of the SLAP philosophy 
 
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections 
In the third and last step a stochastic upward crack growth analysis is performed, starting from 
the time tinitial and the crack distribution (PDF-tinitial in figure 2.5), in which a certain repeat 
inspection scheme (denoted by the crosses in the figure) is simulated by means of the Probability 
Of Detection (POD) function corresponding to the inspection method applied. 
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Once a crack has been found in the numerical simulation of the crack growth, the component is 
being replaced (or repaired) and the new component will have again a period tinitial in which a 
new crack will initiate and grow. From this time again a crack growth analysis can be performed 
using a new crack length value drawn from the crack length distribution function (PDF- tinitial). 
Often it can be assumed that a replaced or repaired component will survive until the economical 
life of the overall structure is reached, since this will normally be less than two times the crack 
initiation period. 
 
 
  
Figure 2.5  Schematised overview of the SLAP philosophy 
The crack growth calculation stops when the component has failed, when cracks have been 
missed in all inspections, or when the economic lifetime of the component has been reached, 
depicted by teconomic in the figure 2.5. 
 
Performing many of such crack growth simulations (with the number of simulations depending 
on the stochastic method applied) finally results in a Probability Of Failure (POF) value. This 
POF value can be obtained for different repeat inspection schemes till a required safety level is 
obtained. For a given inspection method and inspection scheme, the upward stochastic crack 
growth analysis thus results in a probability of failure of the component. Inversely, for a required 
safety level a repeat inspection scheme can thus be determined in an iterative manner. This 
inspection scheme can consist of constant repeat inspection intervals or variable intervals. In this 
way an optimal inspection scheme can be determined. 
 
With this approach the lifetime and inspection scheme can be determined in a fully stochastic 
way, covering the crack initiation and crack growth period, to ensure the safe operation of the 
component reflected by an upper bound of the probability of failure and the inspection scheme 
applied. The approach serves as such as an alternative for the deterministic Safe-Life and 
Damage Tolerance approach. 
 
The backward and upward crack growth calculation is done deterministically, because all the 
variability is already included in the failure distribution. In this way the upward crack growth 
calculation leads to the same failure distribution as originally started with, which is a 
prerequisite.  
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3 FIRST APPLICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
As a first application, the approach presented in chapter 2 will be applied to the Upper Longeron 
of the F-16, having part number 16B5120. The longeron is a tee-extrusion machined from 2024-
T62 aluminium and its function is to distribute flight loads from the fuselage upper skin to the 
center fuselage structure. High positive g-loads may cause fatigue cracking in the tab radii of the 
longeron, see figure 3.1. This longeron is one of the airframe inspection points (point 3005) 
within the F-16 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP). When cracks are detected during 
an inspection the information obtained about crack lengths are registered in the Core Automated  
Maintenance System (CAMS) database. For this particular point a lot of inspection data is 
available and thus serves as a good initial starting point to demonstrate the alternative stochastic 
life approach. Table 3.1 depicts the cracks found during subsequent inspections (boldfaced) for 
different longerons. 
 
 
Figure 3.1  F-16 ASIP 3005 inspection point. Manual eddy current inspection of the tab radii in 
the center fuselage longeron (Figure from Ref. 8) 
 
3.2 Conventional deterministic analysis 
Before presenting the results of the alternative stochastic approach, first the inspection scheme 
will be presented resulting from the conventional deterministic approach. The normal procedure 
to determine the initial and repeat inspection scheme is depicted in figure 3.2. A crack growth 
curve is required, which is determined with the crack growth model as described in the 
Durability and Damage Tolerance Analyses (DADTA) handbook of Lockheed Martin (Ref. 8). 
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This crack growth model has been correlated by Lockheed Martin on data gathered on a test 
aircraft (Ref. 8) and therefore represents a realistic crack growth model for this component. The 
load spectrum applied here is a measured load spectrum representative for the average usage of 
the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF), denoted here as the baseline load spectrum.  
Since the longeron is not a safety-of-flight structure a Durability analysis, instead of a Damage 
Tolerance analysis, has been performed to determine the inspection scheme. Therefore, the 
starting crack length was selected to be a corner crack with a length of 0.007 inch in both 
directions, instead of the 90/95 % detectable crack length ad. Functional impairment has been 
defined (Ref. 8) to occur at a crack length of 0.187 inch. The resulting baseline crack growth 
curve is presented in figure 3.3. Application of the procedure schematised in figure 3.2 to the 
crack growth curve depicted in figure 3.3 leads to the following inspection scheme: 
 
 Initial inspection  2655  Flight hours 
 Repeat inspection      62  Flight hours 
 
It is assumed here that the reliably detectable crack length ad equals 0.1 inch, which is regarded a 
safe value for the manual eddy current inspection technique used to inspect this location. In the 
next section a value will be determined for the detectable crack length based on inspection data, 
altering the above inspection scheme. 
 
Table 3.1 Available CAMS field inspection data (boldfaced numbers) of the tab radii of the F-16 
center fuselage longeron. Normal faced numbers are estimated values (see section 3.3). Crack 
lengths are in inches and lifetimes are in flight hours (see section 3.4). 
 
Phased inspection times (Flight Hours; inches) Longeron
1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 
Failure
time 
1 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.040 0.049    2741 
2 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030    3194 
3 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.035 0.041 0.050    2736 
4 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.028 0.033 0.038 0.047  3189 
5 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030     2994 
6 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.040 0.050   2920 
7 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030     2948 
8 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030     2957 
9 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.027 0.030     2931 
10 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030    3166 
11 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.030     3234 
12 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.030     3177 
13 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.039   3140 
14 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.040  3330 
15 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.040    2880 
16 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.030     3296 
17 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.030      2878 
18 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030      2845 
19 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.030      3049 
20 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.030     3078 
21 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.031 0.037 0.046 0.058 0.082 0.236 2764 
22 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.030 0.036 0.043 0.053 0.070 3074 
23 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.040   3087 
24 0.023 0.026 0.028 0.032 0.038 0.045 0.054 0.070  2896 
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Figure 3.2  Schematic procedure to determine the initial and repeat inspection interval 
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Figure 3.3  Mean crack growth curve for F-16 16B5120 center fuselage longeron representative 
for the average usage of RNLAF 
 
3.3 Probability of detection 
Non-destructive inspection (NDI) is an integral part of aircraft maintenance. The inspection 
method used to inspect this ASIP point is a manual eddy current inspection technique using a 
standard eddy current phase-analysis instrument and a 50-200 kHz shielded pencil-probe. A 
value of 0.1 inch was set as the reliably detectable crack length ad for this ASIP point. 
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If sufficient hit/miss field data is available a Probability Of Detection (POD) curve can be 
constructed, representing a cumulative distribution function reflecting the chance on detecting a 
crack of certain length, see for example figure 3.5. With the detected (hit) and undetected (miss) 
crack length data, presented in table 3.1, enough data was available to construct a reliable POD 
function. 
The most appropriate POD models have been evaluated in reference 9 and it was concluded that 
the log-normal distribution function provides the most realistic POD curve. The log-normal 
distribution has also been recommended by AGARD (Ref. 10). The parameters of the log-normal 
distribution (mean and variance) are determined by means of the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimators (MLE) method, see appendix A.2, with F(ti) equal to Pi representing the probability 
of detecting a crack of length ai. Thus (1- Pi) the probability of not detecting a crack of length ai, 
n is the number of hits and N-n the number of misses.  
 
Since the detected crack length and the number of flight hours at detection are known, an 
estimate can be obtained of the missed crack lengths at the previous inspections, using the 
baseline crack growth curve presented in the previous section. Since the load spectrum of each 
individual aircraft is tracked, resulting in a CSI value, this information can be used to improve 
the individual crack growth curves. The CSI value is a measure of the severity of the load 
spectrum (Ref. 11) seen by the aircraft. Figure 3.4 depicts the scatter found in the load spectrum. 
The data follow a normal distribution. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4  Normal distribution of the CSI ratio (CSI value divided by the baseline CSI value) on 
normal probability paper 
 
The crack lengths thus obtained are also given in table 3.1 (normal faced). The total data set 
consisted of 24 hits and 121 misses and resulted in a MLE fit having the following parameter 
values of the log-normal POD function: 
 
μ  = 0.0528 inch 
σ  = 0.0254 inch 
 
The corresponding cumulative probability plot for the mean POD is depicted in figure 3.5. 
  
-18- 
NLR-TP-2003-609 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5  Mean POD curve for hit (Δ) and miss (x) data of the manual eddy current inspection 
of the F-16 fuselage longeron tab radii 
 
The reliably detectable crack length ad used in the deterministic analysis is defined at 90 % 
probability with a confidence of 95 %. From figure 3.5 a 90/50 % value instead can be obtained, 
yielding 0.085 inch. Furthermore, the figure indicates that the original assumed 90/95 % value of 
0.1 inch is realistic. A 90/50 % value is used here to yield a better comparison with the stochastic 
approach. Based on this smaller value the initial and repeat inspection would yield: 
 
 Initial inspection  2655  Flight hours 
 Repeat inspection      82  Flight hours 
 
More details concerning the construction of this POD function can be found in reference 12. 
Many POD functions can be found in reference 13. 
 
In the stochastic approach, presented in the next section, use is made of the whole POD curve 
instead of the single valued ad to simulate an inspection. 
 
3.4 Application of alternative stochastic life approach SLAP 
So far, the deterministic Durability approach has been applied resulting in an initial and repeat 
inspection of 2655, respectively, 82 flight hours. The corresponding safety level (reliability) is 
unknown. In practice these values are adjusted such that they fit in the inspection policy of the air 
force. The effect hereof on the reliability level is unknown as well.  
 
This section will present the results obtained with the alternative stochastic life approach SLAP, 
as described in chapter 2. The approach is implemented at NLR in a computer code.  
 
Step 1: Construct failure distribution: Weibull analysis 
The first step in the approach is the determination of the failure distribution by means of a 
Weibull analysis (see appendix A and Ref. 7 for details). No test data was available, however 
sufficient in-service data is available, demonstrating the use of this approach. The cracks found 
(table 3.1) do not represent a true failure, defined for this component as functional impairment at 
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a crack length of 0.187 inch, Ref. 8. The failure times are determined by means of a crack growth 
analysis starting from the crack length found up to functional impairment. The number of flight 
hours obtained for each crack is added to the number of flight hours at detection of the crack 
resulting in extrapolated failure times (last column table 3.1). The crack growth analysis used 
again the CSI corrected crack growth curves, correcting for the severity of the load spectrum 
experienced by each individual aircraft with respect to the baseline load spectrum. 
Since sufficient failure data is available to fit a reliable failure distribution, addition of non-
failure data (current accumulated flight hours for non-cracked longerons) is not necessary. Figure 
3.6 depicts the results of the Weibull analysis on so-called Weibull probability paper, resulting in 
a straight line for any cumulative Weibull distribution function, due to the special axis of this 
Weibull probability paper (see figure 3.6). The same distribution in normal co-ordinates is 
plotted in figure 3.10 as a red line. The drawn straight line represents the MLE fit, with 
coefficients as depicted on top of the plot in figure 3.6. The last coefficient (A2-value) denotes 
the Anderson-Darling test statistic value (see appendix B). This is a goodness-of-fit test, and the 
best statistic test for this application, since the Anderson-Darling test is sensitive to deviations in 
the tails of the distribution, which are important here. The obtained A2-value of 0.315 is much 
less than the upper bound threshold value 0.757, necessary to accept the fit as being a Weibull 
distribution with a 5 % significance level. The goodness-of-fit is also illustrated by the fact that 
the failure times, denoted by dots in figure 3.6, are lying well along the fit (drawn line). The 
dashed lines represent the 95 % confidence bounds on the fit, which are narrow, indicating that 
the fit is close to the real one. 
The location parameter t0 (see appendix A) represents the life (2624 Flight Hours) below which 
no failures are to be expected. The summation of the location t0 and scale parameter η represent 
the life (3072 Flight Hours) when 63.2 % of the longerons will have failed. Finally, the shape 
parameter β represents the speed of the failure process. A value of 2.57 indicates a mild failure 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6  Plot of the fitted Weibull on Weibull probability paper and its 95 % confidence 
bounds (dashed lines). The dots represent the longeron failure times 
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The following 95 % confidence bounds where obtained for the distribution parameters: 
 
t0: 2297  <  2624  <  2736 
η: 380.2  <  447.8  <  527.5 
β: 1.854  <  2.568  <   3.557 
 
The confidence bounds are relatively small due to the amount of data, the mean values are used 
in the stochastic analysis, since these values represent reality best. 
 
Step 2: Backward crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and 
corresponding crack length distribution 
The results of the backward analysis are: 
• Initial inspection time 
• Crack length distribution at the initial inspection time 
 
As explained in chapter 2 the backward analysis is controlled by means of two parameters: a 
detectable crack length adet and a threshold probability value pth. Based on the detectable crack 
length the distribution describing the time it takes before a crack of length adet is present in a 
certain percentage of the components (PDF-adet in figure 2.5) is obtained. When a threshold 
percentage (pth) of the cracks have become detectable with a reasonable probability, the initial 
(threshold) inspection becomes opportune. The value of pth is set here at a fixed value of 0.1 %. 
A lower value will not lead to a noticeable earlier initial inspection (see also figure 3.10). A 
larger value can be chosen, however, the shift in initial inspection can also be accomplished by 
selection of another detectable crack length. To study this effect a range of adet values has been 
analysed.  
 
As mentioned before all the scatter present in material properties, load spectrum, et cetera is 
included in the Weibull failure distribution. The scatter in the crack length at a time instance is 
derived from this distribution in the backward analysis using a deterministic mean crack growth 
curve. This of course is not completely correct, since in general the crack growth curves will be 
steeper than the mean curve for the shorter lives and less steep for the longer lives, see for 
example figure 3.7. The real crack growth curves, however, are unknown and thus a stochastic 
backward crack growth analysis is not possible, even if the scatter in material properties and 
loading would be known. The crack length determined with the mean curve will therefore, in 
general, be too large for the shorter lives and too small for the longer lives. Since the probability 
of failure is determined mainly by the mean part and lower tail of the failure distribution, use of 
the mean curve gives an overestimate of the crack length, which is conservative, However, the 
chance on detection (defined by the POD) will not be conservative. Whether the sum of both will 
always lead to a conservative estimate still remains to be examined. However, the Weibull 
distribution function can be chosen as a conservative lower bound, which also accounts for the 
POD curve, introducing the necessary conservatism. 
Also, it is enormously appealing to have an approach in which all the scatter is concentrated in 
only two distribution functions: failure distribution and inspection distribution. Instead of having 
the need for a distribution for all the model parameters (see for example Ref. 1). Moreover, both 
can be determined based on in-service data. This is a very important fact, since this data can be 
determined afterwards as shown here, in contrary to distributions for material properties and 
loading which information should be gathered right away. 
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Figure 3.7  Schematised crack growth curves, representing scatter in material properties and 
loading (Ref. 1) 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the minimum and maximum crack lengths found in a sample of 100,000 
simulations, in which failure times are randomly drawn from the failure distribution and all 
calculated backwards to crack lengths obtained at tinitial (represented by the distribution PDF-
tinitial). This has been done for different values of the detectable crack length adet. From this figure 
it can be concluded that even for very small values of adet cracks can be mainly regarded as long 
cracks and a long crack model suffices, since the lower tail is of no importance to the probability 
of failure. All crack lengths in the sample fall also within the range of the baseline crack growth 
curve applied in the original deterministic analysis. 
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Figure 3.8  Minimum and maximum crack length found in the sample (100,000 simulations) for 
various detectable crack length values 
For one value of the detectable crack length adet a distribution fit is shown in figure 3.9 of the 
resulting crack length distribution at the initial inspection time, which forms the starting point in 
the forward analysis. However, this fitted distribution is not used in the stochastic analysis, but 
the calculated crack lengths themselves, to exclude possible errors caused by fitting the data 
points. In this case the crack lengths at initial inspection is represented very well by an Extreme 
value type 4 maximum distribution (see reference 14), which is a distribution having a lower (a0 
in plot) and an upper bound (a1 value in plot) for the crack lengths. Although the small negative 
value of a0 is not realistic, it indicates possible negative crack lengths caused by using the mean 
crack growth curve for slowly growing cracks. The corresponding PDF distribution is depicted in 
figure 3.10 (green curve) in which all the results of the backward analysis are depicted also. 
Besides the crack distribution at tinitial these consists of: Failure distribution (red curve); Time to 
reach detectable crack length distribution (purple curve); POD distribution (blue curve); crack 
growth curves at 1 %, mean and 99 % of failure times. The detectable crack length for which the 
results are presented in figures 3.9 and 3.10 was set at adet = 0.06 inch, giving the most optimal 
inspection scheme as will be shown later on. Similar results have been obtained for a range of adet 
values, discussed next. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9  Extreme value type 4 max  (Ref. 14) probability fit of crack lengths at initial 
inspection at 2293 Flight Hours (detectable crack length adet = 0.06 inch), for 100,000 values. 
Corresponds with the green PDF plot in figure 3.10 
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Figure 3.10  Backward analysis results plot, consisting of: Failure distribution (red curve); Time 
to reach detectable crack length distribution (purple curve); Crack length distribution at initial 
inspection (green curve); POD distribution (blue curve), 1 %, mean and 99 % crack growth 
curves. Detectable crack length adet = 0.06 inch, initial inspection at 2293 Flight Hours. 
 
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections 
In the third and last step, the crack length distribution at tinitial obtained from the backward 
analysis is used to perform a stochastic crack growth analysis, while simulating the inspection 
scheme. The only random variable now is the crack length at tinitial represented by the distribution 
PDF-tinitial (green curve in figure 3.10). The result of the upward stochastic analysis of course is 
again the failure distribution, however in this step an inspection scheme is simulated. 
As discussed above, this starting crack length distribution is a much more realistic crack length 
distribution than the one used in the EIFS approach. The selected inspection scheme is simulated 
by means of the POD distribution that is determined here with field inspection data and therefore 
realistic (see section 3.3). For each inspection a detectable crack length adet is randomly drawn 
from the POD distribution. When a crack is found (a ≥ adet) the component is replaced and it is 
assumed that the new component is of similar quality (belonging to the same failure distribution).  
During all the inspections a crack may be missed, which leads to a failure of the component (here 
functional impairment). A probability of failure can thus be determined by performing an upward 
analysis for many of these initial crack lengths. The stochastic analysis is stopped when the 
economic life of the component has been reached. An economic lifetime teconomic of 5310 Flight 
Hours is selected here, equal to the deterministic lifetime (Fig. 3.3), to make a more meaningful 
comparison with the deterministic results. 
 
Stochastic analyses have been performed for detectable crack length values adet in the range 0.02 
up to 0.14 inch, the range more or less covered by the POD distribution function, and various 
number of repeat inspections. The results of the analyses are presented in figures 3.11 to 3.15. 
Lowering the detectable crack length will result in an earlier initial inspection, depicted in figure 
3.11, which can easily be understood from figure 3.10. The probability of failure then, in case of 
only this first inspection, subsequently will increase, depicted in figure 3.12, since these cracks 
will be smaller and more difficult to detect. Therefore, starting to inspect too early (small 
detectable crack length) will result in more inspections to obtain a certain safety level than for 
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later initial inspection (larger detectable crack length) as depicted in figure 3.13 for a number of 
POF values. The first number of inspections will in fact be for nothing. 
On the other hand more inspections during the economic life will be required to reach a certain 
safety level when the initial inspection time is postponed too long (large detectable crack length), 
as depicted in figure 3.13. This, because cracks are growing faster and less time is available to 
detect them requiring a shorter repeat inspection interval.  
An optimal initial inspection time, with a corresponding detectable crack length, thus exists 
minimising the total number of inspections. From figures 3.13 and 3.14 it can be observed that 
the optimum for this case lies more or less at adet = 0.06 inch, which is the 69/50 % percentile of 
the POD function, contrary to the 90/95 % percentile used in the deterministic analysis (see 
section 3.2).  
In summary, it is thus economical to start inspecting at a time when the chance on detecting a 
crack is still low, but as mentioned above it is uneconomical to start too early. This is once more 
illustrated in figure 3.14, giving the probability of failure as function of the detectable crack 
length for a number of values of the total number of inspections. 
 
Finally, figure 3.15 depicts curves of equal safety level as function of the initial inspection time 
and the total number of inspections. This is the most important figure expressing the results of 
the stochastic analysis. The repeat inspection interval Δtinsp, which is kept constant in this case, 
can easily be determined from the total number of inspections by: 
 
insp
initecon
insp n
ttt −=Δ   
 
with teconomic equal to 5310 Flight Hours and tinitial and ninsp obtained from the figure. 
The optimal inspection schemes for different POF values (marked by red dots in the figure) are 
given in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2  Optimal inspection schemes for different safety levels 
 
POF tinitial 
(FH) 
ninsp Δtinsp 
(FH) 
10-3 2300 19 158 
5*10-3 2300 16 188 
10-2 2300 14 215 
5*10-2 2400   9 323 
 
Remains the question which safety level to select. A probability of failure of 10-3 for the lifetime 
of a safety-of-flight structure more or less corresponds with a 10-7 value per flight hour (1 failure 
in 107 flight hours), which is regarded as the safety level in a deterministic analysis for historical 
reasons, see section 1.2. For a not-safety-of-flight structure it is reasonable to select a probability 
value of at least one order lower , i.e. 10-2. This results in the following inspection scheme: 
 
 Initial inspection  2300  Flight hours 
 Repeat inspection    215  Flight hours 
 
In table 3.3 these values are compared against the deterministically obtained ones. Compared 
with the deterministically determined values of 2655 FH and 82 FH, this has resulted in an 
earlier (355 FH) initial inspection and much less repeat inspections, 14 instead of 32 = (5310-
2655)/82. In principle this means that in the deterministic case during many inspections no 
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cracks will be found since they are too small to be detected and these inspections are in fact 
ineffective. 
 
Table 3.3  Comparison with deterministic results 
 
 Deterministic Stochastic 
adet (inch) 0.1 0.085 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
POF Unknown Unknown 10-3 5*10-3 10-2 5*10-2 
Tinitial (FH) 2655 2655 2300 2300 2300 2400 
Δtinsp (FH) 62 82 158 188 215 323 
ninsp 43 32 19 16 14 9 
 
From figure 3.15 it can be seen that the probability of failure in case of the deterministic analysis, 
denoted by the green star, is lower than 10-3, indicating a too severe inspection scheme. 
Furthermore, the scheme is far from optimal. 
Again, in practice these values will be rounded off to more suitable values fitting in the overall 
inspection policy applied.  
An even more optimal inspection scheme can be found by including the repair and replacement 
costs and allow for a variable repeat inspection period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11  Time at initial inspection for different values of the detectable crack length 
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Figure 3.12  Probability of failure in case of only one inspection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13  Required number of inspections as function of the detectable crack length for 
different values of the probability of failure 
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Figure 3.14  Probability of failure as function of the detectable crack length for a number of 
values of the total number of inspections 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15  Contour plot for different values of the probability of failure as function of the 
initial inspection time and total number of inspections until teconomic = 5310 FH 
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4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, an alternative life philosophy SLAP was presented by which the lifetime and 
inspection scheme of a component can be determined in a fully stochastic manner, covering the 
crack initiation period as well as the crack growth period in a realistic way. The approach can 
serve as an alternative for the Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance approaches, resulting in more 
realistic predictions of the lifetime and inspection scheme. 
 
The method was demonstrated by a realistic example based on in-service inspection data of the 
Upper Longeron of the F-16. 
 
Advantages of the proposed approach over existing approaches are: 
• One unified approach covering the whole lifetime, including crack initiation, micro, short 
and long crack growth period. 
• No initiation, micro and short crack models are required. Realistic models are still lacking 
and may even never be obtained (Ref. 15). They require the modelling of the microstructure 
of the material, such as: grain size, grain orientation, grain boundaries, dislocations. 
Moreover, the unknown statistics of the crack/material interaction is important to take into 
account. All this makes modelling of initiation and micro cracks very complicated and 
computation time intensive, requiring all kinds of new model parameters, which makes it 
hard for application by aircraft industry. All this is indirectly accounted for by the starting 
failure distribution. 
• Fully stochastic, introducing the concept of reliability based design. This will become more 
important in the near future, given the continuous optimisation of aircraft structures making 
them less reliable, due to the unknown reliability obtained by applying a standard 
scatter/safety factor(s). 
• Only a very limited number of random variables are introduced. In principal all the scatter in 
the structure is covered by the failure distribution, which can be determined on a limited 
number of tests and improved by in-service data. Furthermore, a POD distribution should be 
known (can be obtained from Ref. 13) to simulate inspections. It has to be examined whether 
scatter in the critical crack length should be taken into account (by means of scatter in Kc). 
Realistic load sequences should be applied in the experiments, as is common practise. 
• The methodology is reasonably straightforward and can be easily applied in an engineering 
environment, based on the same deterministic tools as currently used. This is an important 
prerequisite to become accepted. 
• The approach suits very well in the currently applied inspection philosophy applied by 
military and civil operators, and in more recent Prognostic Health Management (PHM) 
systems. 
• More realistic flaw sizes are obtained contrary to the EIFS approach. 
 
Possible disadvantages are: 
• The applicability range and validity of the methodology has yet to be demonstrated. 
• The methodology requires more realistic testing.  
Much less or no coupon testing is foreseen. The reliability of coupon testing versus 
application of these test results on complex component scale can however be questioned in 
the current deterministic design philosophies.  
• Requires introduction of stochastic design philosophy in the engineering environment 
 
Some issues that still need to be addressed: 
• Minimum number of tests required (e.g. determined by reliability testing). 
• Prove the starting distribution can be selected conservative (see appendix A and also Ref. 7). 
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• Demonstrate the updating of the failure function during service life. 
• Examine the necessity to include separate “rogue flaws”. This can be done by means of a 
predefined chance on occurrence that can easily be integrated in the stochastic process. 
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Appendix A  Weibull Analysis 
A.1 Introduction 
 
The failure distribution function can be determined from experimental data by fitting a 
distribution function to a sufficient number of failure points. Since the failure probability will be 
largely determined by the lower tail of this failure distribution, a large number of tests on the 
component under view are required in order to determine the lower tail of the distribution 
function with sufficient accuracy. It is superfluous to say that this is unwanted in general. If 
however, a lower bound curve of this failure distribution could be found, requiring a limited 
number of tests, this would be acceptable. In that case the design could be based on this 
distribution function, which would be conservative, and in-service data gathered during the 
lifetime of the component can then be used to improve the estimate of the real failure 
distribution. 
 
The in-service data consist of non-failure and failure data, which both are used to improve the 
estimated failure distribution as will be discussed below. The non-failure data consists of usage 
times at the moment of inspection in case of non-detects and failure data will consist of the time 
and crack lengths found during inspections. The latter are therefore no real failures. The lifetime 
at the moment of crack detection can be easily extrapolated by means of a (long) crack growth 
analysis to obtain a realistic failure time. 
 
The Weibull analysis method (Ref. 7) is very suitable in this respect, for the following reasons: 
• The Weibull distribution function plays an important role in failure analysis and often is the 
most suitable distribution to describe a failure mode. 
• An initial conservative lower bound estimate of the real failure distribution can be obtained 
with only a few failures (Chapter 2, Ref. 7). If even only non-failure data is available, an 
initial conservative lower bound of the real failure distribution can be determined by means 
of a Weibays or Weibest analysis. 
 
 
A.2 Parameter estimation 
 
Mathematically the Weibull distribution function is defined as: 
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where 
t = time to failure 
 t0 = location parameter 
η = scale parameter 
β = shape parameter 
 
F(t) is the so-called cumulative distribution function and f(t) the probability density function 
obtained by differentiating F(t): 
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F(t) represents the fraction of components that has failed at time t, which can also be expressed 
as R(t) = 1 - F(t) called the reliability, being the fraction that has survived at time t. 
The location parameter t0 represents the starting point of the distribution (no failures are present 
before this time) and can be selected zero in a number of cases. 
The scale parameter η is a measure of the characteristic life of the component and represents the 
time when 63.2 % of the components have failed. 
The shape parameter β is a measure of the speed of the failure mechanism and normally lies in 
the range of 2 to 6. A value larger than 1 denotes a wearout failure mode and a value of 4 or 
higher denotes a very fast failure mechanism (rapid wearout). A value equal to 1 indicates a 
constant failure rate, which is independent of the elapsed time. In other words the failures are 
random and lack memory of the past. A value less than 1 denotes a decreasing failure rate, or in 
other words an increasing reliability when the component ages. This is referred to as infant 
mortality rate. 
 
The unknown values of the parameters t0, β and η are determined from a set of available data 
points, which may consist of a mix of failed and non-failed sample times, so-called multiple 
censored data. Various methods exist to fit these three parameters, of which the method of 
maximum likelihood is the preferred one. This method is based on a so-called likelihood 
function L, describing the probability of obtaining the observed data and it can handle multiple 
censored data.  
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where: 
n = number of failed samples 
N = total number of samples 
 
F(t) and f(t) are the cumulative distribution function, respectively, probability density function 
given by equations A.1 and A.2 in case of the Weibull distribution function. 
 
The three parameters t0, β and η are now found by maximising this likelihood function, which 
can be obtained by differentiating the log-normal of equation A.3 with respect to t0, β and η and 
equate the result to zero, resulting in equations A.4, A.5 and A.6.  
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The values for t0, β and η, (determined iteratively with the above equations A.4, A.5 and A.6), 
are estimates of the real values and therefore denoted by the symbol ^. The more failure and non-
failure data is available the better the estimates. A so-called confidence interval can be 
determined (Ref. 7) which contains the true value of the parameters. In order to ensure that a 
conservative estimate is obtained for the failure distribution, the lower bound value for the 
location t0 and scale parameter η can be selected. For the shape parameter β an upper bound 
value can be selected, since this is a measure of the speed of the failure mechanism. 
 
Even in the case only non-failure data is available an estimate of the parameters can be made. 
Then, for β a value is assumed, based on historical failure data of similar components or 
engineering judgement. A lower confidence bound of 63.2 % for η can be found by setting n 
equal to 1 in equation A.6. This resembles the situation where the first failure is assumed to be 
imminent and is called the Weibayes method. Assuming that the first failure is imminent is often 
very conservative. A less conservative approach is selecting n=0.693 resulting in a 50 % lower 
confidence bound on the true Weibull, the so-called Weibest method. For more details see 
reference 7. 
 
Appendix B  Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test 
There are many goodness-of-fit tests, for example Komolgorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, 
Shipiro-Wilk. The Anderson-Darling test is more sensitive to deviations in the tails of the 
distribution than the older Komolgorov-Smirnov test. The Anderson-Darling test can be applied 
to any distribution. The Anderson-Darling test (or Komolgorov-Smirnov or Shipiro-Wilk) does 
not tell you that you do have a certain type of distribution function, it only tells you when the 
data make it (un)likely that you do. 
The Anderson-Darling test statistic value is determined by: 
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where F() is the cumulative distribution function and n the number of observations. 
The result of this formula needs to be modified for small sampling values. In case of a normal 
and log-normal distribution this is: 
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The value then must be compared with the following values, where α is the significance level, to 
accept (less than) or reject (larger than) the distribution function. 
 
α 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 
A2crit 0.631 0.752 0.873 1.035 
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In case of a Weibull or Gumbel (XG = ln(1/XW)) distribution the modified value yields: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=
n
AAm
2.0122  (B.3)
 
The value then must be compared with the following values to accept (less than) or reject (larger 
than) the distribution function. 
 
α 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 
A2crit 0.637 0.757 0.877 1.038 
 
 
